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Abstract: Creating Shared Value hinges on the interdependence between a 
company's success and social welfare, and also the identification and expansion 
of connections between that company and society. Because critics say the 
concept is counterproductive, in that it focuses too narrowly on the company´s 
economic value creation, we take a materiality analysis approach of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). This approach provides evidence of what is important 
to stakeholders and promotes meaningful corporate disclosure, central to the 
Global Reporting Initiative. This study reports on a materiality analysis of the 
cruise industry, comparing stakeholder concerns/demands with both the relevant 
literature and existing CSR reports to determine to what extent the current 
industry definition of its social responsibility matches the expectations of its 
stakeholders, and subsequently, to theorise reasons for the patterns found. 
Results evidence that cruise companies tend to both over-report immaterial 
issues and under-report material issues, without responding to stakeholders' 
requests. 
Keywords: corporate reporting, Global Reporting Initiative, corporate 
governance, stakeholder management, stakeholder engagement. 
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1. Introduction  
The responsibilities of businesses towards society and the environment we live 
within are defined by the economic, legal, ethical and discretionary expectations 
that society has of organisations at a given point in time (Carroll, 1999; Carroll 
and Shabana, 2010). Corporate Social Responsibility CSR is therefore dynamic; 
shifting in line with environmental and social changes, external demands and the 
moral maturity of the organisations themselves. Demands come in the form of 
expectations from stakeholders who also experience the effects of corporate 
behaviour and evaluate the fit of corporate performance with their expectations 
(Wood and Jones, 1995). 
Organisations have come to recognise the need to identify the 
expectations and concerns of a wide group of stakeholders in order to define an 
approach for meeting those expectations. In so doing, the companies can move 
towards sustainable development, rather than limiting their approaches to the 
resolution of specific conflicts. The stakeholder engagement process allows the 
companies to identify the relevant and material issues for their stakeholders, 
which are vital for a company to drive its strategy and create value with society; 
the process indicates the information needed by the stakeholders to judge the 
organisation’s performance. CSR practicing and reporting are inextricably 
intertwined and “cannot be understood in isolation of each other or the 
organisational functions and operations on which they impinge” (Adams, 2008). 
However, the information is not necessarily material because there is Little 
evidence that stakeholders are being genuinely engagedbecause there is  
(Unerman, 2007; Manetti, 2011). This is why materiality analysis has been placed 
at the centre of the Global Reporting Initiative  (GRI) G4 sustainability reporting 
guidelines.  
This research undertakes a materiality analysis of the cruise industry 
comparing stakeholders’ concerns/demands with both the relevant literature and 
cruise industry CSR reports firstly, to determine to what extent the current 
industry definition of its social responsibility matches the expectations of its 
stakeholders and secondly, to understand the reasons for any patterns found.  
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2. The reasons for materiality analysis 
The need to ensure that CSR practices are material to stakeholders, and that 
those stakeholders are engaged in shaping and delivering the CSR practices of 
any given firm, is not new. In line with the firm’s CSR strategy, the range of 
stakeholders to be taken into consideration, and the dialogue and attitudes 
towards them, will be directly dependent upon its motives for engagement in CSR 
and its social and environmental reporting. Sustainability reporting “is a process 
that assists organisations in setting goals, measuring performance and managing 
change towards a sustainable global economy – one that combines long term 
profitability with social responsibility and environmental care” (GRI, 2013a:85).  It 
is a platform for the external accounting of economic, environmental, social and 
governance impacts and how the organisation is taking responsibility for 
continuous improvement. Sustainability reporting complements financial 
accounting and provides a complete view of a company’s performance and value 
creation (SASB, 2013; Murninghan, 2013). The existing literature uses four 
alternative frameworks to explain the reasons for CSR engagement, which help 
explain the shift towards more material CSR practices, and consequently 
communication.  
The first theory, reputation and risk management, is based on the 
avoidance of factors that can negatively influence corporate brands, thus 
avoiding public relations scandals (Bebbington, Larrinaga and Moneva, 2008). 
The theory relies on the use of sustainability reports to restore a positive image 
of the firm and recognises the importance of transparency to reputation (Adams, 
2008). The second provides a resource-based view of the firm and suggests that 
companies act responsibly to maximise their competitive advantage in a way that 
cannot be imitated easily by competitors (Russo and Fouts, 1997), although this 
traditional form of value creation focuses on short term profits, not on a holistic 
view (Porter and Kramer, 2011). These two reasons would respond to what Porter 
and Kramer (2006) call “responsive CSR” i.e. addressing generic social issues 
and value chain impacts with an inward, often short term, focus. Firms following 
these reasons would engage in shallow stakeholder engagement such as 
posturing, and any so-called materiality analysis would be “an end-of-pipe filter 
to help produce more streamlined and useful annual sustainability reports” 
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(AccountAbility, 2006: 29) to reduce corporate risks from CSR reporting.The third 
framework for CSR engagement is that of stakeholder theory, which argues that 
corporations act in response to stakeholder requests, either in a preventive or a 
proactive way (Wood, 1991). The level of proactivity would define whether this 
third approach is also responsive or more strategic. Sustainability reporting then 
becomes a channel to cater to the information needs of different stakeholder 
groups by explaining how the company addresses their expectations. The move 
towards more inclusively addressing the value chain and the competitive context 
by transforming value chain activities to benefit society is “strategic CSR” that 
Creates Shared Value. Finally, Creating Shared Value (CSV) explains 
engagement for the purpose of value creation and product differentiation. This 
should combine a respectful and proactive attitude towards stakeholders and 
provide success and creation of value (Wheeler, Colbert and Freeman, 2003; 
Porter and Kramer, 2006). Strategic CSR is corporate strategy integrated with 
the core business objectives and competencies to create triple bottom line 
returns, a driver for innovation and economic growth. Porter and Kramer (2006) 
predict a necessary move from CSR to CSV, as social responsibility moves from 
damage control or public relations campaigning to building shared value between 
society and business. CSV should “supersede CSR in guiding the investment of 
companies in their communities” (Porter and Kramer, 2011:76) because it is 
businesses’ best chance at restoring legitimacy, increase trust and reputation 
(Farache and Perks, 2010; Leavy, 2012; Porter and Kramer, 2006).  
The principle of CSV focuses on “identifying and expanding the 
connections between social and economic progress” (Porter and Kramer, 
2011:66). This is characterised by policies and operating procedures that 
enhance competitive positioning, while simultaneously advancing the economic 
and social conditions of the communities within which the company operates 
(Maltz and Schein, 2012; Jonikas, 2013; Pfitzer, Bockstette and Stamp, 2013). 
Porter and Kramer (2011) stress that CSV exceeds ethical standards, law 
compliance and the mitigation of negative impacts caused by the business; it 
represents a new way of understanding customers, productivity and the external 
influences on a corporation’s success. CSV is about expanding value through 
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improved operational processes, not about sharing the value already created 
(Porter and Kramer, 2011; Camilleri, 2012).  
CSV differs from CSR in how it is practised. First, re-conceiving products 
and markets means innovating and developing products to satisfy previously 
unmet needs that existed in the market before their creation (Porter, Hills, Pfitzer, 
Patscheke. and Hawkins, 2012). Second, CSV requires businesses to identify 
their positive and negative social impacts and then to re-imagine value chains 
and redefine productivity accordingly. Porter (1986) refers to the value chain as 
a tool to identify those operational issues that have an effect on both the 
companies’ performance and the social consequences of business activities. In 
practice, CSV entails channelling resources for innovations to solve social 
problems (Pfitzer et al., 2013). Third, developing supportive clusters generates 
new value and is rooted in the idea that “the success of every company is affected 
by the supporting companies and infrastructure around it” (Porter and Kramer, 
2011:77).  
Nevertheless, the active pursuit of shared value requires different thinking and 
internal actions, such as establishing and embedding shared value within the 
corporate culture. This may be achieved by defining a clear social purpose, to be 
subsequently publicised or embedded in core processes such as strategic 
planning and budgeting (Pfitzer et al., 2013). Since there is a fundamental 
interdependence between a company’s success and social welfare (Nohria and 
Ghoshal, 1994) the difficulty lies in balancing short-term costs against long-term 
externalities (Kramer, 2006). 
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3. Materiality analysis as a multi-purpose tool 
Materiality analysis has a role to play in CSV as a tool for prioritising issues and 
strategic planning, allowing an integrated approach to defining a sustainability 
strategy and to reporting. CSV requires stakeholders to be involved in the 
identification of problems (Pfitzer et al., 2013) (one of the core steps of the 
materiality analysis methodology), as more value is created when companies 
diligently seek to serve the interests of a broad group of stakeholders (Freeman, 
1984; Harrison and Wicks, 2013).  Due to the growing relevance in the agenda 
of non-financial, social, environmental and governance issues, there is no way 
back from integrating environmental and social governance outcomes into 
business strategies by highlighting those issues that provide current or potential 
opportunities for social progress and where, by innovating and developing 
products accordingly, shared value can be created. Defining which issues 
arematerial to the company encompasses discerning materiality to its 
stakeholders, industry and the environment.  
SASB (2013) defines materiality as a long-term focus on issues that make 
a major difference to both an organisation’s performance and the information 
needed to make sound judgements. This provides a methodology to evaluate 
which issues are material to an industry overall and/or to a specific business, in 
order to determine materiality both for management priorities and subsequently 
for disclosure. AccountAbility (2006) provides a three stage framework 
corresponding to the criteria of inclusivity, alignment and embeddedness: (1) 
identify, as extensively as possible,  a list of issues that are relevant to the 
business and its stakeholders; (2) prioritise the issues; and (3) ensure that the 
outcomes this consultation inform internal decision making and external 
assurance.  
GRI G4 (2013b) offers a complete implementation manual on how to 
standardise the prioritisation of issues, risks, and opportunities using stakeholder 
inputs and company insights to determine material issues and report content. 
Briefly this consists of first, identifying triple bottom line aspects and topics (within 
and outside the company), applying the principles (GRI G4, part 2, 2013) of 
sustainability and stakeholder engagement (Messier, Martinov-Bennie and 
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Eilifsen, 2005); second, of prioritising by employing the principles of materiality 
and stakeholder inclusiveness, commonly captured and visually represented in a 
Materiality Matrix (Murninghan, 2013; GRI, 2014);  then, validating using the 
principles of stakeholder inclusiveness to assess the aspects against scope, 
boundaries and time, ensuring the report provides reasonable and balanced triple 
bottom line impacts; and finally, reviewing the outcome by using the principles of 
sustainability and stakeholder engagement by revising the aspects that were 
material in the previous reporting period.  
The main, practical difficulty is how to categorise issues as ‘material’ or 
‘immaterial’ (Lo, 2010; FRC, 2011), not only because this assessment is based 
on a qualitative analysis, but also because it requires internal and external criteria 
to be clearly defined (i.e. the various parameters that label an issue as material), 
in order to evaluate the impact of each potentially material issue against those 
criteria. Materiality is “the potential change in expectations that determines 
whether an item is relevant” (Lo, 2010:133) and therefore a complex matter of 
well-reasoned professional judgement (Messier et al., 2005; Iyer and 
Whitecotton, 2007). A threshold is needed to indicate which issue will be 
considered material enough and which actions this label will result in. GRI (2006) 
defines the materiality threshold as the degree of importance attached to each 
issue, indicator, or item of information at which aspects become sufficiently 
important to be reported/disclosed.  
CSR reports look considerably different when viewed from a materiality 
perspective. Rather than accounting for all the CSR actions undertaken (both 
relevant and not), the reports become an account of the state of the art on all 
material impacts (whether the company has chosen to act towards them or not). 
A cruise company therefore would report on staff wages and working conditions 
rather than on philanthropic progammes for their families, for example. We 
currently know more about the disclosure of immaterial CSR actions (60–70% of 
CSR reported data, according to CSR Wire (2013) and Deloitte (2013)), than we 
do about the omission of material aspects (Murninghan, 2013). KPMG (2011) and 
FRC (2011) found that the main causes for disclosure of immaterial information 
are the expectations of regulators and external auditors, the social pressure for 
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certain content and a lack of confidence in the managers responsible for making 
materiality judgements (Lo, 2010).  
A change in focus to what is material to a company’s value (to their business 
and their key stakeholders) allows for more credible, relevant and user-friendly 
reports (GRI, 2013a) that are aligned with the principles of CSV. Yet in 2014, no 
cruise company has reported under the G4 criteria (GRI, 2014). Also, current 
academic research focuses on measuring CSR activity, rather than assessing 
the reasons behind those activities, measuring their impacts or determining links 
to stakeholder needs (Moneva, Archel and Correa, 2006; Basu and Palazzo, 
2008). The present research attempts to establish the reasons behind CSR 
reporting and disclosure, as perceived by different stakeholders in the cruise 
industry, and thus to provide a new angle to the literature. Additionally, by 
performing a materiality analysis of CSR indicators in the cruise industry, we 
identify stakeholder relevant aspects (including a gap analysis of the list of issues 
considered to be important by stakeholders versus the list addressed in reports) 
and reveal a measure of how businesses respond to what stakeholders consider 
relevant. Considering that CSV is about “finding ways to leverage the connections 
between social and economic progress to create more value shared among 
multiple stakeholders” (Maltz and Shein, 2012: 58), this research identifies areas 
that create the greatest shared value, provides guidance for future CSR reporting 
and offers an opportunity for leveraging competitiveness. 
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4. Methods 
This study builds on Bonilla-Priego, Font and Pacheco-Olivares’ (2014) cruise 
industry CSR reporting system and baseline data and compares cruise 
companies’ current reporting practices. In this study we test how material the 
indicators in that system are, according to internal and external stakeholders, 
before assessing current cruise reporting against the material indicators.  
To date, 23 parameters have been identified that evaluate the relevance 
of an issue and, using these parameters, 71 issues have been defined as clearly 
material across several related industries, based on the academic (Benoit, 1995; 
Bebbington et al, 2008; Lydenberg, Rogers and Wood, 2010; Gibson, 
Papathanassis and Milde, 2011; Muñoz-Torres, Fernandes-Izquierdo, Rivera-
Lirio, Leon-Soriano, Escrig-Olmedo, and Ferrero-Ferrero, 2012) and grey 
literature (SASB, 2013; GRI, 2013a). These material issues and parameters were 
compared to Bonilla-Priego et al’s (2014) baseline indicators to pre-test the 
materiality of these indicators. Some of the material issues, such as employee 
skills, health and safety, resource usage and environmental impacts, have strong 
links with competitive advantage (Porter and Kramer, 2011). Most parameters 
are linked with the creation of a competitive advantage such as attracting and 
retaining talent, peer-based norms and innovation. First, this research reduces 
the initial 200 baseline indicators to 63 indicators, deleting those that the literature 
review does not define as material, and those that are seldom reported in Bonilla-
Priego et al. (2014), to keep the questionnaire manageable (see Table 1).  
*** Insert table 1 here 
This research maintains the indicators within the original categories used 
by Bonilla-Priego et al. (2014); the indicators use accepted definitions supplied 
by the GRI, and by tourism and maritime navigation international organisations. 
Accordingly, when calculating the average value of a category, the multiple 
indicators in the same category are given the same weight. The list distinguishes 
between management and performance indicators, and hard and soft indicators, 
to later identify the types preferred by each stakeholder group, as well as the 
most reported.  
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The instrument employed in this research is a self-selected, online, Likert-
scale questionnaire. Respondents are asked to answer the same three questions 
for each of the 63 indicators divided into four sections: a) general strategic and 
management approaches to CSR, b) economic, c) social and d) environmental. 
The three questions focus on the areas of: (1) relevance, (2) influence and (3) 
reasons to report. More specifically: (1) Relevance: “How important is it that the 
cruise sector reports on this indicator?”, which addresses CSR materiality, 
aligned with the second step of materiality analysis guidelines of GRI (2013b); (2) 
Influence: “What is your influence in the cruise sector addressing this indicator?”, 
which assesses stakeholder influence, an issue hardly researched to date 
(Rodrigue, Magnan, and Boulanne, 2013) and relevant to effective involvement 
of stakeholders in decision-making (Manetti, 2011); and (3) Reasons to report: 
This question offers four alternatives for why the cruise sector might report on an 
issue: i) avoidance of negative impacts influencing corporate brands, based on 
reputation and risk management theory, ii) economic, based on the resource 
based view of the firm, iii) in response to stakeholders’ requests, based on 
stakeholder theory and iv) value creation and product differentiation, based on 
CSV. 
The research utilises a selected panel of experts to assess materiality as 
the industry-specific terminology of the indicators makes it more pertinent to use 
cruise industry experts, rather than non-experts, to evaluate materiality. An 
alternative method, convenience sampling, tends to increase response rates but 
suffers from self-selection bias (Coombes, 2001), rendering it less suitable.  The 
use of a non-representative sample of experts is more pertinent in arriving at a 
correct decision than a representative sample of non-experts (Rowe and Wright, 
1999; Worrell, Di Gangi, and Bush, 2013). Therefore, stakeholders are selected 
from university networks, relevant conference proceedings and websites from the 
cruise companies, destinations, and non-governmental organisations. Those 
contacted via email are encouraged to identify additional stakeholders in the field. 
Moreover, the questionnaire link is shared on professional online networks to 
gained a broader access to expert opinions. To ensure that respondents meet 
the profile quality criteria, participants are asked to include their company name 
and e-mail. This information allows the researchers to disqualify those 
 11 
participants that are not representative of any stakeholder group selected, while 
maintaining anonymity. Confidentiality and anonymity help to reduce (but not 
avoid) individual biases, personal influences and group-thinking. 
The press release for the Bonilla-Priego et al. (2014) study invited 
stakeholders to download the full article if they completed the materiality 
questionnaire. Over a period of two months, this research obtained data from 59 
respondents distributed across nine initial stakeholder groups, based on 
Freeman (1984) and Clarkson (1995) (see Table 2). Of the nine stakeholder 
groups (communities where the company operates, customers, labourers and 
suppliers of capital, equipment and materials) seven were legitimate stakeholders 
(Phillips, 2003). Two groups (owners and creditors/shareholders) were removed 
from the analysis because less than five observations were received for each and 
the ninth, a consultants group, was created because there were enough 
representatives to justify it.  
*** insert table 2 here 
On average, respondents took approximately 15 minutes to complete the 
pre-piloted and improved questionnaire. The research employed a Rensis Likert 
scale, commonly used in questionnaires when measuring opinions, attitudes or 
beliefs (Li, 2013), with a “forced choice” six-point scale (avoiding middle point 
answers). Closed questions asked respondents to choose from a defined list of 
options and the questions were tested for clarity. The design of the 
questionnaires recognised the impact of wording on the quality of data obtained 
in multi-item scales (Swain, Weathers, and Niedrich, 2008). The questions were 
not hypothetical, reliant on memory, double barrelled or leading, and no question 
was in the negative i.e. no reverse thinking is needed (Hartley, 2014). The risk of 
common variance, which could be avoided using reverse questions, is lower by 
surveying experts. Questionnaires of this character are easy to administer, and 
by providing uniform answers, they are easy to code, process and analyse 
(Coombes, 2001). Questions were expressed as affirmations, to minimise mis-
responses due to the use of negations (Swain et al., 2008). To ensure 
consistency with the different indicators, in terms of what ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ 
implies, the research did not combine negatively and positively keyed items and 
reverse coding. Each scale was anchored to the left by the answer “extremely 
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high” and to the right by “extremely low”. Although negatively worded (reverse-
coded) items may reduce common method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003), 
research has shown that reverse-coded items may produce artifactual response 
factors consisting exclusively of negatively worded items (Harvey, Billing and 
Nilan, 1985), and respondents may establish a pattern of responding to the 
questionnaire that may fail to attend to the positive-negative wording of the items 
(Schmitt and Stults, 1986).  
Each question was analysed separately and in some cases, responses were 
totalled to create group scores. The study analysed Likert scale items as interval-
level data (Carifio and Perla, 2008). The use of parametric tests can be applied 
regardless of the original data distribution; what matters is the distribution of the 
means. According to the Central Limit Theorem, with a sample size per group of 
greater than 5, means are normally distributed, although small samples require 
larger effects to have the power to detect statistical significance (Norman, 2010). 
Therefore, since previous materiality analyses have not provided enough 
information to determine the minimum number of respondents, the minimum 
sample size per group for this research was set at 5. The research used a t-test 
to assess the statistical significance of the difference between two sample 
means. If the mean of a manager’s indicator sample equaled 4.7 the research 
tested if the sample mean was statistically significant at 4 (High) or 5 (Very High). 
The two requirements used to detect the most material indicators were: i) 
statistical significance of the mean was 5 (Very High), and ii) the value of 5 was 
included in the 95% confidence interval. 
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5. Materiality assessment of cruise baseline indicators  
The results show that 54 of the 63 indicators meet the materiality baseline of a 
mean of five (out of six), and a confidence interval of 95% (see Table 3). The 
majority of the material indicators are categorised as social indicators (25), 
followed by general company information (12) and environmental (12). It is worth 
noting that all five economic indicators from the original Bonilla-Priego et al study 
were returned as material. In addition to the 54 material indicators, the nine 
remaining indicators are defined as ‘somewhat material’ and belong to three 
categories: i) labour and management relations; ii) diversity and equal 
opportunities; and iii) materials. No indicator is considered as extremely important 
(with a score of 6 out of 6), as survey participants are typically reluctant to give 
extreme answers (Li, 2013). 
There are differences in what is perceived as material by different 
stakeholder groups (see Table 3). In social categories for example, managers 
have an overall score of 4.2, compared to employees with a score of 5.0 or 
customers of 5.2.  Within this category the indicator “LA9 Health and safety topics 
covered in formal agreements with trade unions” is extremely unimportant for 
managers, yet all other stakeholders consider it to be very important. 
Furthermore, there is a high level of disagreement on the importance of human 
rights between managers and employees, and in the environmental dimension 
between managers and consumers. Questions relating to society (within the 
social dimension), which cover issues related with destinations, receive a high 
score by consumers, but not by managers, employees and suppliers.  Managers 
(from ports and cruise companies) rate every indicator category as less important 
than any other stakeholder group, notably employees, rates them.  
*** insert table 3 here  
Table 4 shows that stakeholders value material soft disclosure slightly more 
(although it is less verifiable, see Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari, 2008; 
Bonilla-Priego et al, 2014) than hard disclosure. Equally management indicators 
are perceived as highly important, above performance indicators (e.g. human 
rights under investment on procurement practices, compared to non-
discrimination, at 4.6 versus 3.2). Based on the literature we expected internal 
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stakeholders to prefer soft and management indicators because they 
demonstrate the actions taken (rather than being judged by the outcomes). So, 
in the short term, internal stakeholders would favour reporting on “vision and 
strategy claims” rather than hard evidence of “compliance with regulations” and 
“number of sanctions”. Adams and Zutshi (2014) suggest that stakeholders want 
to see the big picture rather than the detail, which coincides with the findings in 
this study. Reporting expectations vary across stakeholders (Azzone, Brophy, 
Noci, Welford, and Young, 1997; Tilt, 2007) and further qualitative research is 
needed to understand preferences. 
*** insert table 4 here 
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6. Cruise stakeholders’ perceptions of their own influence  
We continue by analysing how the cruise industry’s stakeholders perceive their 
own influence on the way in which the cruise sector addresses its impacts (Table 
5).  Results indicate that CSR cruise reports do not reflect the voice of the 
stakeholders but that of the companies instead, and they fail to create sufficient 
value and market legitimacy (Schuman, 1995; Camilleri, 2012; Bosch-Badilla, 
Montllor-Serrats, and Tarrazon, 2013). As expected, internal stakeholders 
perceive they have more influence than external stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; 
Clarkson, 1995). Suppliers, a primary but external stakeholder, have the lowest 
perception of influence, possibly explained by the strong buying power of cruise 
companies. Representatives of destinations also perceive that they have a low 
influence, which can be explained by the history of cruising companies playing-
off destinations against each other (Lester and Weeden, 2004; Garin, 2005). 
Klein (2011) argues that stakeholders directly impacted by the cruise industry do 
not take part in determining sustainability.  Our data shows that consumers and 
society that do not depend on the industry perceive they have the highest power 
to influence cruise sustainability practices and reporting.  
In general, stakeholders tend to perceive they have more influence on soft 
(not easily verifiable) indicators, than on hard indicators that cannot easily be 
mimicked (Bonilla-Priego, et al., 2014; Clarkson, et al., 2008). The same is true 
in relation to perceiving they have more influence on management than on 
performance indicators. These are both tests of the maturity of disclosure and 
stakeholder involvement, explained by the early stages of defining CSR agendas 
and the headline involvement of stakeholders, while the details are worked out 
internally. Management indicators are a precondition of implementing 
performance indicators that include specific actions (Bonilla-Priego et al, 2014). 
Managers, followed by employees, have the highest perception of their influence 
on both hard and soft data.  
Stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory (Cormier, Gordon and Magan, 
2004) advocate that stakeholder groups with the least power are the least 
addressed in reports. The data of perceived influence/power suggest that reports 
are written for a broad consumer audience and not for primary stakeholders like 
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suppliers. Although there are aspects that consumers perceive to have high 
influence on what companies address, the cruise reports show that the coverage 
of these topics is very limited. For example, some reports include less than 25% 
of the indicators that consumers perceive to have a high influence such as 
product responsibility, health and safety or customer privacy.  
*** insert table 5 here 
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7. Materiality content of CSR reports from cruise companies  
This study also compares disclosure of the 54 material CSR indicators against 
the original 200 baseline indicators from Bonilla-Priego et al. (2014), for the 29 
cruise companies identified by the study that had some CSR published 
information by 2012, either as CSR reports (11) or on their website (18). The word 
´companies´ is used loosely because multiple brands belonging to the same 
holding company often publish separate CSR reports (for example Princess 
Cruises, Holland America Line, Costa Cruises, P&O Australia, Carnival, Aida 
Cruises and Yachts of Seabourn, all publish separately but are part of Carnival 
PLC). Because the study compares CSR data available in 2012 (but sometimes 
dating back to 2009) with 2014 stakeholder expectations, and stakeholder 
expectations increase with time (Dawkins and Lewis, 2003; Bertels and Peloza, 
2008), the analysis is reported using amalgamated figures rather than individual 
company data.  
The results of the analysis show that the cruise industry is at an early stage 
of CSR engagement (Table 6), as cruise companies report more general than 
triple bottom line information. The materiality assessment evidences that the 
cruise industry displays only 40% of the material indicators from the industry 
baseline and that information is unbalanced, for example we have low scores for 
environmental and social initiatives, economic performance and society. Cruise 
companies report on only 33% of the environmental indicators that stakeholders 
consider material. This lack of transparency fuels the academic criticism of 
cruising’s negative impacts on the ecosystem (Gössling, Peeters, Hall, Ceron, 
Dubois, Lehmann, and Scott, 2012; Klein, n.d.). Disclosure is high for indicators 
such as water (64%) and emissions, effluents and waste (55%) that lead to cost 
savings or are increasingly regulated, but there is no disclosure for example of 
biodiversity material indicators. Older ships are criticised for not meeting 
operational specifications and for posing an environmental risk; to a great extent 
this is because higher standards have been brought in but retrofitting ships is 
unfeasible and changes only occur when renewing cruise fleets (Klein, 2011; 
Bonilla-Priego, et al., 2014).  
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CSR reporting might be a reactive answer to external pressures (Jose and 
Lee, 2007) driven by earlier cruise practices damaging brand reputation (see 
Garin, 2005), but the limited stakeholder pressure explains why only 30% of the 
social material indicators are disclosed. Within this, 25% of the human rights 
indicators are disclosed, perceived as having a low materiality by cruise 
managers (see earlier Table 3) despite media accusations (see for example BBC, 
2014), and 24% of product responsibility information indicators are disclosed, 
despite media negative coverage of health and safety (Paterson, 2008). Cruises 
apply and display standards and regulations, as evidence of Labour and Decent 
work disclosure (52%), but fail to tackle some sensitive issues for which they are 
receiving negative press. The cruise industry publishes headline data on its 
positive economic contribution to the regions where cruises operate and on the 
creation of jobs (CLIA, 2013; FCCA; 2014), yet only discloses 23% of the 
economic indicators that stakeholders consider material.   
*** insert table 6 here  
There are some noteworthy differences between CSR reporting and stakeholder 
expectations. Stakeholders place slightly more importance on soft and 
management indicators than the cruise companies do, while the cruise 
companies dedicate large parts of their reports to hard and performance 
indicators (but clearly not on the aspects that stakeholders value as much). The 
proportion of material indicators disclosed is not statistically different depending 
on whether companies disclose via CSR reports (39% in Bonilla-Priego et al 
(2014) compared to 40% of material indicators) or on their website only (3% 
versus 2%).  However, the act of producing sustainability reports increases the 
quality of disclosure significantly, for example, Holland America and P&O 
Australia, top reporters in the Bonilla-Priego et al study, report more than 50% of 
all types of material indicators. Instead, companies with CSR information 
available only on their website (i.e. without a dedicated CSR report) make weak 
public declarations of commitment rather than displaying verifiable data, being 
reactive to sector wide pressures but failing to deliver (Bonilla-Priego et al., 2014). 
This overall lack of information contrasts starkely with previous findings 
relating to the positive reasons for reporting i.e. mainly to minimise risks and avoid 
negative impacts on corporate brands. Transparency is opportunistic; the cruise 
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industry displays favourable reports with environmental claims and positive 
aspects to maintain an environmental image while under-reporting on key issues.  
The lack of stakeholder management and engagement in the sector is evidenced 
by efficient contingency plans to minimise potential harm and deal with cases 
where expectations cannot be met. Finally, the failure to address material issues 
at an industry level (17% material disclosure) indicates a tendency of cruise 
companies to protect their interests by providing a positive bias that could be 
seen as greenwashing. 
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8. Perceived reasons for cruise companies reporting on CSR 
Finally, this study finds that there are differences in perceptions between 
stakeholder groups with respect to why they think cruise companies report as 
seen in Table 7.  We posit that CSR reporting is limited in its capacity to 
differentiate the product or to add value, primarily due to both a lack of 
stakeholder management and a lack of materiality content in CSR reports. The 
results have implications for stakeholder engagement and stakeholder 
management. This research demonstrates that the four CSR theories tested are 
complementary, with little variation between the reasons overall. As a benefit to 
their reputations, companies must engage more effectively with credible 
stakeholders in the future; a lack of engagement has been a constant in social 
reporting practices in cruising (Bonilla-Priego et al., 2014). There is potential for 
cruise companies to benefit significantly from improved stakeholder management 
and engagement, specifically with cases where expectations cannot be met 
(Howitt and McManus, 2012).  
Legitimacy and reputation/risk management theories are better than CSV 
and stakeholder theories at helping to explain the reasons why cruise companies 
are undertaking more sustainability actions and reporting. Internal stakeholders 
claim to act responding to stakeholder requests, while external stakeholders 
attribute the companies´ actions to avoiding negative impacts. For example, 
stakeholders confirm the expectation from Bonilla-Priego et al. (2014) that cruise 
companies act and disclose predominantly on CSR aspects that lead to cost 
savings. “Avoiding negative impacts influencing the corporate brand” is a 
reputation and risk management option that confirms Bonilla-Priego et al.´s 
(2014) claim that cruise companies make weak public declarations when reacting 
to sector-specific pressures. Within the Social and Environmental dimensions 
category, both internal and external stakeholders state reputation and risk 
management as the main reason for reporting. The low scores given by 
Government Destination stakeholders are noteworthy, as the reasons to 
“differentiate products to create value” and “to respond to stakeholders’ requests” 
have low scores. Internal stakeholders perceive these as more important than 
any of the external stakeholders do, except consumers.  
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In 2007, Jose and Lee showed that cruise companies involve fewer 
stakeholders than other sectors. While CSR may be more inclusive seven years 
later, results demonstrate that the perceived influence of suppliers is still very low 
(33.7%) along with external suppliers’ perceived control over what cruise 
companies address and report, whereas employee engagement can be seen as 
considerably improved; employees feel they have an influence on 62.3% of the 
aspects that cruises report on and they perceive they have high control. Cruise 
companies are missing out on the opportunity to increase their value and 
performance by engaging their suppliers and stakeholders more broadly. 
*** insert table 7 here  
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9. Discussion and conclusions 
This study makes a contribution to knowledge by illustrating the gap between 
corporate intent and stakeholder desires in CSR reporting for the cruise industry. 
It shows how materiality analysis can play an important role in readdressing CSR 
towards being more inclusive of the needs of stakeholders, hence facilitating CSV 
by co-conceiving the company’s social responsibility agenda with society in a 
more strategic way (Leavy, 2012; Porter and Kramer, 2006). A clearer 
understanding of what is material to stakeholders points to future progress in 
managing and reporting CSR to respond to stakeholder expectations.  
Although sustainability reporting has become standard practice among the 
largest companies in each industry, we still find big cruise line brands that are not 
reporting and others that are reporting poorly. This opens interesting questions 
about legitimacy motivations, and stakeholder management and engagement. 
Nearly fifteen years ago, companies claimed that their main reasons for not 
reporting on sustainability were confusion about what to report, the lack of 
information systems or the lack of a corporate social reporting committee 
(Adams, 2002), but today, these reasons are wearing thin. This study points 
towards a number of sector-specific characteristics that contribute to explain why 
the cruise industry is behind other sectors in reporting, and how what is reported 
differs from what stakeholders expect. The mobility of cruises, and their use of 
flags of convenience, reduces the stakeholders’ sense of influence over these 
corporations. A ship is considered the territory of the country in which it is 
registered and this is why many vessels are registered in countries without 
stringent laws and without the capacity to monitor safety and working conditions 
or to investigate incidents. When the ship is in international waters, it comes 
under the jurisdiction of the flag registry plus international laws. Under these 
conditions, some cruise companies choose to ignore the business case for 
sustainability reporting (Stubbs et al., 2013).  
A gap analysis of the difference between stakeholders’ expectations and industry 
reporting practices shows that the reporting is incomplete and there is a lack of 
stakeholder engagement and accountability, with companies dominating this one 
direction dialogue. Sustainability reporting is currently a legitimation tool to 
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discharge responsibility and protect corporate image. The evidence would 
suggest that, to date, cruise companies consider legitimacy in terms of traditional 
business outcomes and not in terms of their responsibility towards society. 
Paraphrasing the Cape Town Declaration of Responsible Tourism, Goodwin 
(2011) would refer to this as society being used by the cruise industry, instead of 
the optimal situation of society using cruising. Cruise companies are currently 
characterised by large externalities, paid by the different stakeholders either as 
loss of revenue or actual costs passed down the supply chain. These may 
decrease profitability and competitiveness when they are internalised through 
social and political pressures or market mechanisms, unless they are 
appropriately managed through stakeholder engagement in a way that it creates 
shared value.  
The current disclosure of already regulated or cost-saving activities will 
temporarily mitigate some short term criticism, but reporting can stagnate unless 
cruise companies engage stakeholders on the issues the latter consider 
important. Although involving stakeholders does not mean a specific moral 
intention (Greenwood, 2008) and reports can still be used as a legitimation tool 
(Adams, 2004), actual engagement and the disclosure of this process of 
engagement, as G4 emphasises, will help to increase the prominence of other 
stakeholders groups. The cruise sector should undertake strategic CSR by 
addressing a) generic social issues (such as practices to address forced and 
compulsory labour, which are reported by 45% of companies with reports) and b) 
value chain impacts (such as actions taken to not damage the biodiversity of 
ecosystems, currently not reported by any cruise companies). To create social 
value, the cruise sector must change its engagement from being reactive to 
external pressures, for instance changes in regulations or bad press (Petrick, 
2011), to making internal decisions (Jose and Lee, 2007) to find opportunities to 
steadily create value for society. The difficulty lies in balancing short-term costs 
against long-term externalities (Kramer, 2006), adapting to upcoming regulations 
in undertaking the materiality process. 
Scholars support that materiality plays an important role in CSV (Porter 
and Kramer, 2006; Kyte, 2008; Camilleri, 2012) by helping identify the most 
relevant issues for the long-term maximisation of value. Cruise companies are 
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highly dependent on both human (labour and workforce) and environmental 
(water and energy) capital, which are neither owned nor controllable. Regarding 
long-term performance and financial perspective, companies are dependent on 
the availability and quality of those capital items to create value.  
Material reporting favours targeted and focused reports, and avoids over-
reporting and greenwashing. Nevertheless, there is a risk of irresponsible 
companies using isolated efforts towards stakeholders to counteract harmful 
operational actions (Crane, Palazzo, Spence, and Matten, 2014). Adequate use 
of material reporting facilitates the comparability of reports and stakeholder 
decisions; it can also assist cruise companies in decreasing the positive bias of 
information disclosed, which otherwise often includes immaterial items. By 
providing credible reports that address matters that are critical to achieving the 
organisation’s goals and the value it provides to society, material reporting 
benefits an organisation by maximising its competitive advantage.  
In practical terms, this study creates a set of material indicators for cruise 
company reporting, and improves the guidelines on minimum standards for 
industry material, comparable and meaningful CSR engagement and 
standardised reporting. Academics and practitioners expect the sustainability 
standards to move from a long collection of unrelated measures, to a much 
smaller number of meaningful metrics, highlighting their connection to strategy 
and the performance of those metrics (Jaeger, 2014; Anderson and Varney, 
2015). Using this materiality principle, this study has reduced the 200 baseline 
indicators from Bonilla-Priego et al. (2014) to 54 material indicators selected by 
industry stakeholders. The findings help cruise executives to prioritise and reduce 
the resources allocated to reporting, in line with SASB and GRI, by contributing 
towards the identifaction, selection and reporting of the most material indicators. 
Moreover, this study gives evidence of the variability of how cruise stakeholders 
view sustainability indicators.  Knowing the most relevant issues and indicators 
for each industry stakeholder group can assist cruise executives in aligning their 
sustainability efforts with their stakeholders’ concerns. By discussing the most 
material sustainability issues, this article provides information on how to develop 
the CSV concept for the cruise industry. Understanding the reasons for reporting 
and the influence each stakeholder group has on the cruise company will provide 
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clarity on how to address the needs of stakeholder groups. These results provide 
a new angle to improve stakeholder engagement and management in CSR 
reporting and disclosure. 
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